“JAPAN’S FOREIGN AIDS POLICY TO AFRICA”
THE CASES OF ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE WITHIN
THE TICAD PROCESS

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ABSTRACT: This article presents an overview of the authors’ doctorate thesis. It investigates about Japanese foreign aid to Africa during and after the Cold War and in relation to the process that has emerged in the before and after the Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development (henceforth TICAD) Process. Specifically, it examines an empirical case study of the TICAD as an intersection of international relations theory and decision-making policy mostly of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in order to address Japanese aid to Africa particularly to Angola and Mozambique from a long-term perspective. The author argues that the TICAD Process is a clear case of efforts by Japan and particularly MOFA to achieve Japanese national interests. To this end, TICAD links several policies such as peacekeeping and aid combined with trade and investment. A major conclusion is that the Japanese aid priority areas towards Angola and Mozambique are consistent with the TICAD after the Cold War and with Japan’s attempts to replicate its Asian development experiences to Africa, as well as with human security objectives as a component of Japanese foreign policy and guiding principle of Japan’s ODA in the XXI century. Finally, the article is divided in three broad parts: introduction, development and main findings and conclusion.

Key words: TICAD, Angola, Mozambique, Japan, foreign policy, aid, theory

RESUMO: Este artigo resume a tese de doutoramento do autor que versa sobre a política externa de ajuda pública ao desenvolvimento (APD) japonesa para África durante e após o fim da Guerra Fria, antes e depois da organização da Conferência Internacional para o Desenvolvimento Africano de Tóquio (TICAD). Especificamente, a tese examina o Processo TICAD como uma intersecção da teoria de relações internacionais e a política de decisão Japonesa principalmente do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros Japonês (MOFA) para investigar a política de ajuda japonesa para África, particularmente para Angola e Moçambique numa perspectiva de longa-duração. O autor argumenta que o TICAD é o instrumento principal do MOFA para alcançar e defender o interesse nacional japonês. Para este fim, o TICAD combina diversas políticas tais como Operações de Paz e APD, articuladas com comércio e investimento. Das várias conclusões apontadas no
artigo destaque para a consistência entre a política externa de APD do Japão para Angola e Moçambique e o Processo TICAD no pós-Guerra Fria e, as tentativas do Japão para aplicar o seu “modelo” asiático de desenvolvimento em África e os objectivos de “segurança humana” como componente da sua política externa e princípio basilar da APD Japonesa no século XXI. Finalmente, o artigo está sistematizado em três partes: introdução, desenvolvimento, resultados e conclusão.

**Palavras-chave:** TICAD, Angola, Moçambique, Japão, política externa, APD, teoria

### 1. Introduction

Through this study, the author has provided a long-trend and systemic analysis of the nature of Japan’s foreign aid policy to Africa during and after the Cold War, before and after the organization of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (henceforth TICAD). The first TICAD was held in October 1993, and occurred every five years thereafter. The last TICAD was held in May 2008.

The methodology of this thesis applied an aggregate analysis based on data compiled from primary sources by the author specifically for this study. Besides the core case studies targeting Angola and Mozambique, it included four additional case studies in order to contextualize the analysis and discussion of the results. The sources used include official reports and statistical data from the United Nations, IMF, World Bank, and OECD/DAC. It also includes primary and secondary resources of information based on documents from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MNE) and materials gathered in original, current interviews with representatives of ministries and embassies.

The TICAD was a useful lens for thinking about Japanese aid policy in the region because it provides several policy instruments for analyzing Japan’s development role in Africa. Angola and Mozambique were meaningful case studies for analysis in terms of policy implications within and outside of the TICAD because the two countries can be considered a “test case” for Japanese African policy in the wake of the post-Cold War period, and also within the TICAD framework. In other words, this thesis aimed to answer the question of whether or not the TICAD Process meant in fact the enactment of an aid policy both to sub-Saharan Africa, and Angola and Mozambique, something which during the Cold War did not exist: Rather, at least until the mid-1980s aid was an instrument of foreign policy and not a policy in and of itself.

In this context the research examined the bilateral official development assistance from Japan to Africa from 1960 to 2008/09 focusing on two broad aspects. One was centred in Japan’s foreign aid policy to Africa within the perspec-
tive of the TICAD Process. Here, by using the term Process, the study introduces the concept of referring to the series of conferences and activities in its interim periods. The other emphasized Japan’s foreign aid policy to Africa with official development assistance (henceforth ODA) as the main line of analysis thus, excluding the TICAD Process. This way of analysis helped us understand how Japan’s aid policy to Africa differs when considered “inside” or “outside” of the TICAD, during and after the Cold War. Even though the study has four parts, in a narrow perspective ODA and the TICAD enclose different purposes. In this context, this study could be divided into two independent parts: With and without the TICAD Process.

The first part has examined how systemic international and domestic changes have affected Japan’s foreign aid policy decision to organize the TICAD. In addition, what are the political, social, and development implications of the TICAD Process in the context of Japan’s aid policy to Africa. The study found that after the Cold War the TICAD has become Japan’s instrument framework to remake its foreign policy toward the continent based on the two principles of “ownership” and “partnership.” These two principles are on the one hand a reference to Japan’s own experience in terms of the importance that “self-help efforts” and “self-reliance” have for development. On the other hand, “partnership” means supportive cooperation between partners, which implicitly reflects Japan’s past conventional aid stance in terms of establishing an aid philosophy beyond the requested-basis principle.

The second part has addressed Japan’s aid place in Africa from a systemic perspective in terms of what and how international and domestic factors have affected Japan’s decision to allocate of aid to Africa. With regard to domestic issues there were several factors that triggered three kinds of changes, such as changes in the aid composition, changes in the aid policy, and changes in the aid system. There were also international systemic changes that were structural (the end of the Cold War) and regional (the end of the apartheid and the civil conflicts in Angola and Mozambique). These factors linked with domestic changes to evoke a profound impact on the way Japan looked at Africa. In the transition from the end to the post-Cold War and as a result of the interaction between international and domestic changes, Japan’s aid diplomacy realigned itself with Africa. However, this study was not narrow but rather aimed for an interdisciplinary and complementary approach between ODA and the TICAD.

The study has addressed the theoretical question of whether or not TICAD has been driven by domestic changes or by international changes or alternatively by both. The focus of this issue is to determine whether TICAD has been driven by domestic factors or by international factors in terms of pressures affecting decision-makers or even by the combination of international factors and structural changes in the international system. In this context, the role played by each of the actors, including the civil society (NGOs) involvement in development assistance both at the domestic and international level was analyzed to assess how
their interaction has affected Japan’s aid decision making toward Africa, as well as the organization of the TICAD Process.

The theoretical question was extended to analyse how the effects of those factors have influenced Japan’s foreign aid policy to Angola and Mozambique, and how have they provided an explanation for the changes in Japan’s allocation of aid to these two recipients. The choice of this approach reflects the rationale that foreign policy decisions arise because the domestic politics to some degree are affected by events external to the state. Hence, the author believes that the existence of international pressures and structural changes in the international system have influenced Japan’s foreign aid policy and allocation of aid to sub-Saharan Africa, the organization of TICAD, and the allocation of aid to Angola and Mozambique.

In addition, Japan’s response to domestic factors in terms of demands emanating from Japanese civil society and other ministries involved with aid decision making suggests that the donor domestic interests were also important if not the determinant link in producing the aid-policy outcome in terms of changing behavior.

The argument that dominated the study is that the TICAD Process is a clear case of Japanese government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), to achieve Japanese national interests both at domestic and international levels. The argument was confirmed by way of findings from analyses in this study.

In this light, the study was conducted based on two approaches. The first concerns the impact of the combined domestic and international factors that led to a philosophical shift in Japan’s foreign aid policy. This shift represents Japan’s departure from the traditional pattern of development economic cooperation that during the Cold War rarely has dealt with long emergency situations in fragile states or conflict-affected countries (also known as war torn countries). The second-examined Japanese ODA to Africa from the traditional perspective in terms of measuring, which countries have received the most substantial shares of Japanese ODA and in what amounts and forms. It departs from this viewpoint and examines Japanese ODA to Africa based on the sub-Saharan African country typology and the level of economic development.

2. Development

It is important to note that the aim of the study is not to concentrate on the quantity (though acknowledging and even analysing it) but rather focus on the quality of Japanese ODA as it is assumed that the strategy for helping fragile states is significantly different from that used to assist low-income countries.

Throughout this study it became evident that the Japanese aid spectrum of intervention in Africa has widened since the end of the Cold War. As a result,
Japanese ODA was re-evaluated as a foreign policy instrument. Besides the traditional diplomatic approaches of ODA, represented as commercial, strategic, political, bureaucratic, or humanitarian interests, Japan sought to combine a development assistance approach with an integrated approach to conflict prevention and consolidation of peace by addressing its roots causes. According with the revised ODA Charter such causes were seen to lay in poverty reduction and lack of sustainable growth (trade and investment) as much as in peacebuilding related problems.

As a result, the significance of this study is that besides analysing Japanese ODA to Africa it looks into relations between Japan and Africa during and after the Cold War. Simultaneously, it does this in light of principles developed in the TICAD Process. Angola and Mozambique here identified as conflict-affected countries were chosen and compared because both of these two countries were not major aid recipients during the Cold War, but now are. In addition, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia were analysed to assess the main differences and similarities between Angola and Mozambique. The main finding was that the pattern of Japan’s aid policy to Angola and Mozambique is markedly different than toward Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia. Angola and Mozambique as contrasted to these four recipients proved to be appropriate objects of the study to analyze changes in Japan’s approach to Africa and also in terms of its policy implications to the TICAD Process while the others were not.

Also, the author to explain Japan’s foreign aid policy to Angola and Mozambique as a result of the interaction between domestic and international factors formulated the following framework here called *Japan’s aid policy to Angola and Mozambique within the TICAD Process*.

The framework was specifically formulated to illustrate how the interaction between the four hypotheses explain Japanese foreign aid policy to Angola and Mozambique as a result of Japan’s domestic approaches and international factors influence towards Angola and Mozambique.
The framework is complemented by four hypotheses that framed Japan’s aid policy toward Africa from a four-angled theoretical approach.

(H1) The greater the contribution in peacebuilding assistance from Japan to Angola’s and Mozambique’s consolidation of peace, the greater the likelihood of peace, security and development in those countries.

(H2) The greater the respect for good governance principles by Angola and Mozambique, the greater the likelihood for increased the level of aid allocated by Japan to grassroots human security projects in those countries.

(H3) The greater the contribution of Japan to address Angola and Mozambique’s basic human needs, the greater the likelihood of those countries’ commencing reconstruction and reducing poverty.

(H4) The greater the Japanese aid allocation to trade-related capacity development in Angola and Mozambique, the greater the likelihood and level of trade increase between Japan and those countries.

The hypotheses served to assess the determinants of Japanese ODA to Angola and Mozambique identified in the Figure below that summarize the key variables, predicts the results of these variables, the means of verification, and the method of analysis.
The hypotheses, besides identifying theoretical connections and outcomes between the different research traditions within an eclectic approach, were also related to Japan’s various interests such as peacebuilding, political, humanitarian and human security, development, and economic interests.

In this light, it is useful to highlight the specific findings in the thesis and assess its significance in regard to “Japan’s foreign aid policy to Africa: The case of Angola and Mozambique within the TICAD Process.”

The theoretical chapters (one and two) constitute the first part of this study. Besides presenting the research problem, the authors’ framework linked the case study to the TICAD Process, surveyed the theoretical schools of thought (liberalism, pluralism, idealism, neorealism, neoliberalism, realism, and Marxism) applied to foreign aid, and reviewed the scholarly approaches toward addressing Japan’s aid policy to Africa.

Chapter one provided an overview of the literature on Japan’s aid relations with Africa through various policy objectives from the 1960s to the present. These policy objectives identified seven analytical approaches in terms of the purposes and interests associated with Japan’s aid rationale to Africa from the perspective of foreign policy making: commercial or mercantilist approach, strategic and political approach, reactive state approach, bureaucratic approach, proactive state approach, humanitarian approach, and development approach.

Overall, Japan’s rationale for providing foreign aid has shifted frequently over time. However, during the Cold War it is not difficult to predict the reasons for theses changes or why Japan’s aid decision-making could not be neutral. This predictability is based on domestic and international factors. The domestic factors include Japan’s resource needs and commercial interests mostly in South Africa. Economic assistance to sub-Saharan Africa was used either to appease the frontline African states or to protect Japan’s diplomatic and economic interests within the wider context of African international politics. The international factors were related to the ideological alignments and the political bipolarity associated with the patterns of Cold War. As a result, from the 1950s to the late
1970s, based on the long-term view of Japan’s national interest, the commercial approach, the political-strategic approach, and the bureaucratic approach characterized Japan’s aid rationale to Africa.

In the 1980s, the reactive, the bureaucratic, and the humanitarian approaches most affected Japan’s aid decision with Africa. In the 1990s however, it becomes difficult to frame Japan’s aid policy within an analytical approach even within shorter periods of time. This is due to the new element in Japan’s African aid policy, the TICAD. Thus, Japan’s aid rationale within the TICAD increased in dynamism in an attempt to abate the criticism that Japan was being a reactive state.

The literature has also shown that the TICAD is highly useful to test both the proactive and the development approach. The importance of these two approaches is that they outpaced others in terms of analysing Japan’s aid rationale after the 1990s through the TICAD process due to its catalytic role expressed in the political, economical, and human-development policy framework. As a result, from the perspective of the decision maker the TICAD’s biggest advantage is its inclusion perspective, not its exclusion perspective. Moreover, the literature has shown that after the mid-1990s and 2000s, in response to domestic and international conditions and in line with the ODA Charter the Japanese government adopted a much broader perspective of the visible role of aid assistance to Africa. Japan’s interests and policy objectives are now much wider than in the past.

With or without the TICAD, Japan’s present rationale for aid to Africa can be analysed through a combination of different approaches. This suggests that an eclectic approach based on different theoretical schools of thought are needed to explain Japan’s foreign aid policy to Africa.

Chapter two, besides reviewing the main doctrines of the schools of thought within the international relations theoretical framework (Realism, Idealism, and Marxism), assessed their relationship with foreign aid policy in general and particularly in the case of Japan as donor. As a result, it found that Japan’s foreign aid policy to Africa does not fit easily into one sole theory, partly because of the nature of Japanese state and its pacifist nature, partly because of the place that Africa occupies in the world international political economy. Nevertheless, when examining Japan’s aid relations with Africa, as in the case of other donors it should not be viewed in terms of power, prestige, economic resources or political purposes but simply how a state can contribute toward economic development and alleviation of poverty in another state through aid. And since Japan has been a member of OECD from early on, the main feature of its aid policy should reflect solely idealist and humanitarian concerns, rather than neo-realist interests, for example. However, the findings of this research study indicate that idealist, realist/neorealist, liberalist/neo-liberalist, and pluralist considerations also support Japan’s aid rationale to Africa.

From the realist perspective, the significant factors influencing both aid allocation and the organization of the TICAD Process are linked to national policy...
objectives such as political security, prestige, and influence or Japan’s determination to become a political power. This explains Japan’s determination to achieve permanent membership in the UN Security Council, and its active involvement to raise African support though aid diplomacy in the UN General Assembly. However, it can be argued that as a realist power, Japan has made extremely limited contribution to UN peacekeeping. The results in this study point to a gradual increasing focus by Japan on peacebuilding and human security. This focus is considered more acceptable given the Constitution and the liberalist perspective, as opposed to the realist perspective and a more expansive role in peacekeeping operations that could involve a military role. The third pillar of the TICAD Process itself is the evidence that Japan emphasizes consolidation of peace through peacebuilding.

Similarly, the study demonstrated that the Japanese definition of human security, namely the achievement of “freedom from fear and from want” has been applied within both within Japan’s foreign aid policy and the TICAD Process. With the ODA Charter human security was strengthened and thus became one of the most important issues of Japan’s ODA in Africa.

In addition, the neo-realist theory argues that the concept of national security overlooks domestic conditions and focuses solely upon the state structure of the international system to protect, for example its national economic and security interests. In fact the concept is multidimensional because it can be linked to several approaches including the liberalist, the pluralist perspective, and the neoliberalist perspective within a heterodox approach. With the end of the Cold War, these three schools of thought gained impact in Japan’s aid policy due to the domestic political structure which included an individual and civil dimension to an aid program that had previously emphasized the collective over the individual. For example, the promotion of NGO to implement MOFA’s Grant Aid for Grassroots Human Security Projects reflects the humanitarianism of NGOs, thus linking Japanese aid also to the idealist and the pluralist theories through participation of civil society in social, political, and development processes. The case study chapters six and seven show both evidence of the above stated.

In regard to Marxism and neo-marxism, this study did not find any conclusive evidence of this school of thought in Japan’s aid policy goals. Although Japan’s foreign aid program has an economic dimension, albeit one much less accentuated than in the past, Japan’s foreign aid policy goals fit much better with a neo-liberalist perspective than neo-realist perspective, and even less so with Marxist/neomarxist theoretical perspectives. As a result, the neo-marxist theory has become difficult to sustain. After the mid-1980s Japan’s aid policy to Africa is strongly influenced by humanitarian concerns within the idealist theory. In addition, since the early 1990s there has been a collective shift in the international donor community including that of Japan, which accentuates poverty reduction and goal oriented development cooperation (MDGs), as well as restructuring for debt relief.
After the end of the Cold War the paradigm of development assistance can no longer be seen within the contradictions embodied in the international capitalist system or as a form of exploitation made by the developed world to the developing world as the structuralist and neo-marxist or dependency paradigms claimed during the 1970s. In this context, Japan has followed the international norms of aid allocation - it could not act in any other way - and has dramatically increased its bilateral humanitarian aid and post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance to Africa. As a result, Japanese aid to Africa after the Cold War can no longer be called neo-mercantilist because in the TICAD Process, political implications of Japanese foreign aid policy are made clear.

The middle chapters (three and four) compose the second part of this study. Here, while centring the study of Japan’s foreign aid policy on the TICAD Process, the ways in which international factors interacted with domestic factors and the degree to which domestic politics have been affected by this interaction were addressed. These chapters also analysed the TICAD since 1993 as a framework for an enhanced development role for Japanese aid in Africa within the human security concept.

Chapter three analyses Japanese foreign aid policy to Africa both in the political and security context before and after the TICAD, and analysed its political implications in order to elucidate how international factors such as foreign pressure influenced policy changes in Japan’s aid policy. In addition, the linkage of Japan’s foreign policy instruments such as ODA, trade, and FDI were analysed in the context of the TICAD Process, ending with an analysis of the role of human security in Japanese foreign policy and its tie to the TICAD Process.

This chapter showed how since the post-World War II, especially from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, Japan attempted to rebuild its African diplomacy based on a combination of UN values, the Bandung principles, and its own economic interests without disregarding its alliance with the United States. However, the bipolarization of the international system prevented Japan from practicing a multilateral diplomacy across all dimensions. As a result, from the 1970s to the mid-1980s Japan’s foreign aid policy became more pragmatic, increasingly an extension of Japan’s own post war reconstruction in search of markets and resource acquisition efforts rather than a development policy in the true sense.

During the Cold War period there is clear evidence that Japan reacted both to American and western pressures and also to multilateral pressures (by DAC and the UN). However, the overall influence by international factors in terms of outside pressure urged more attention to African humanitarian needs on a voluntary and convenient “cooperation” basis rather than as a “forced” concession by Japan. This is evident in Japan’s separation of politics and economics, in its refusal to participate in peacekeeping operations, its indifference to African and OUA sanctions and criticism in the attempt to “stop” Japan from trading with South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique, in the unresponsiveness to DAC requests to adopt a geographical reorientation of its ODA towards Africa and
away from Asia, and finally in the low volume of ODA. However, in late 1980s, Japan began to evidence more humanitarian concerns. Again, there is no clear evidence that Japan’s changes in aid policy were directly caused by international pressures. The fact is that Japan understood that its mercantile image had high political costs in its UN diplomacy, and this contributed to its change in interpretations about Africa. In addition, within the international system Africa’s political context was changing, as was that of the superpowers. Particularly the USSR regime was showing signs of political exhaustion. This had repercussions on its supporting to African clients. Additionally, the apartheid regime of South Africa that followed gain of independence of Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique was becoming isolated. Japan dual diplomacy began to change. The end of the Cold War represented a golden opportunity for Japan engage with Africa within a new approach. Politically, given Japan’s image of an aid power, the organization of TICAD enhanced its international prestige, as its main goal in contributing to the resolution of African problems was sufficiently appealing both at home and abroad.

In terms of how Japan has reacted to international pressures and decided to organize the conference, Chapter three found evidence that in early 1990s, African pressures stemming particularly from the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), the Organization of African Union (OAU), and the World Bank influenced Japan’s decision to look for alternative diplomatic strategies. However, the extent to which these pressures have affected the organization of TICAD and subsequent demands of African leaders is limited. It should be recalled that diplomatically, the TICAD Process amplified the space of manoeuvrability in Japan’s foreign policy, thus representing a fundamental departure from the one-dimensional, state-centred economic strategy towards a multilateral approach in foreign aid policy. The TICAD introduced several instruments, including the traditional aid channels, economic cooperation through trade and investment, and human security and peacebuilding aspects in the broader context of Japanese national security, to increase the projection of Japanese “soft-power” politics in the international system. The increase of Japan’s “soft-power” results from the international acceptance of the TICAD conference new methods to approach development. In addition, the concept of human security has acquired a dimension that goes beyond Japanese foreign policy itself. JICA is adding a human security dimension in all of the projects it builds.

In summary, the chapter found that in a time of aid fatigue, MOFA’s African diplomacy merged points of convergence between its own interests and those of the international community around the TICAD Process. However, the final decision to organise the Conference cannot be easily linked with external stimuli and is instead the result of Japan’s domestic national interests.

Chapter four answered the question of how the combination of ODA and the TICAD lead to the realization of Japan’s national interests. It also identified the domestic political events that induced changes in Japan’s foreign policy, and
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delineated which actors within Japanese government opposed or favoured the move to a more comprehensive African policy embodied in the TICAD. It then assessed the extent to which the civil society advocacy has decision-power in the TICAD Process, and ended with an overall assessment of the impact of Japanese ODA in Africa through the TICAD Process.

With regard to ODA, the main finding presented in this chapter was that aid policy, once considered the most important pillar of Japan’s foreign policy to ensure Japan’s economic and security interests and political ambitions, proved to be insufficient to protect Japan’s state interests. On the one hand, Japan’s national interest cannot be dissociated from the international aid trend in early 1990s that shift back toward a more sustainable policy emphasizing poverty reduction and soft aid policy measures to achieve the ultimate objective of development. On the other hand, international factors like the Gulf War in 1990-1991, the need of Japan to include political considerations in its basic aid philosophy, and its strive to do more for the maintenance of international security particularly in Africa exposed the weaknesses of ODA as a major financial instrument of foreign policy. However, it was the worsening domestic fiscal situation, the crumble of the developmental state system, the bursting of the bubble economy, the ODA corruption scandals, the public critics about Japan’s ODA and lack of effectiveness and transparency, the great emphasis on hardware aid with disregard for software aid, and finally the increasing voice of NGOs that were ultimate determinants for the reforms in the aid system and aid policy, particularly after 1997.

The TICAD’s main asset is that it became for the MOFA a new political and diplomatic mechanism. This is due to its interdisciplinary approach that combines social, political, economic, security, humanitarian, and development issues, and international cooperation goals based on Japan’s Asian experience as well. After the first TICAD, MOFA realized the political potential of the TICAD that allowed it as the Ministry most interested in Africa to mobilize the international donor community (such as the UN, World Bank, and GCA), the recipients, and civil society. It should be noted that MOFA put several obstacles up against the participation of NGOs. However, as the pressure by these organizations both from Japan and from Africa became unbearable to the MOFA on the one hand, the MOFA acknowledged that NGOs could be useful. Not only could they pass a message of shared partnership both at home and abroad but also their knowhow in the field of development cooperation was useful. Consequently, the participation of NGOs in the following conferences was allowed. The significance of TICAD grew not only for MOFA but also for the Japanese Prime Ministers who understood the political visibility of TICAD improved Japan’s national interests in international organizations like the UN, the World Bank, and the African Union.

The TICAD’s biggest advantage is that by involving the Diet on aid issues beyond simple budget approval it engaged other ministries like the Ministry of External Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Min-
istry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (MAFF), the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) within a more proactive approach. This also led to inclusion of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the private sector and the NGOs toward involvement with African development. It was also found that like Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), other ministries, particularly MAFF, could use TICAD to achieve interests beyond development such as in lobbying the whale commission to support hunts. In this context, the chapter confirmed MOFA’s diplomatic ability to articulate the several interests of all the relevant stakeholders around TICAD.

Over time, two reasons justified the ascendancy of MOFA in the decision-making bureaucracy as the most important player in ODA decision-making to Africa. First since the inception of ODA to Africa, MOFA has always been the greater supporter of increased ODA to the continent. Second, the MOFA’s ability to articulate the domestic and international pressures and to make changes in the ODA policy in its own interest showed that a consensus in aid policy by Japan is possible because most of the ministries involved were never in opposition, as presently most of them are active participants of TICAD. However, civil society (as represented by NGOs), while participating in the TICAD, was not given a role in the decision-making process. To date, the most that National Government Organizations (NGOs) representing the civil society have within the TICAD Process is the statement of several policy recommendations and implementation of some previous demands of the civil society organisations (CSOs), which are only weakly engaged in the TICAD process is weak. It could be argued that MOFA, by excluding a more active role by NGOs in the TICAD, is defying an “invisible” player - the public opinion that is the ultimate supporter of its aid policy to Africa and the TICAD as well. An internal consensus within the ODA bureaucracy is important but a nationwide consensus around TICAD and aid to Africa is crucial. Ultimately, the African leaders themselves have high prejudices against participatory democracy by NGOs is noteworthy.

Another finding relates to the ODA sector breakdown and the TICAD during the period from 1991-2008. An increase in the bilateral ODA supporting social development activities such as education, health and medical services, population program, water supply and sanitation, and government and civil society, is visible. The volume of bilateral ODA to social development increased from US$92 million in 1992 to US$489 million in 2008. Given Japan’s long involvement in economic infrastructures, it is surprising that social development has matched and sometimes surmounted the volume of ODA to economic infrastructures in 1992, and from 2002 to 2006 and in 2008.

Though Japan identifies peacebuilding as a priority in its ODA Charter and Mid-Term ODA Policy, only recently have its disbursements to consolidation of peace have increased, particularly after 2004. It should be noted that a great part of the aid for peacebuilding and consolidation of peace is allocated to fragile
states or conflict affected countries. In these cases it was also found that Japan prefers earmarked to core multilateral funding. This reflects both Japan’s needs to respond to political priorities, and also the need to channel ODA through UN agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF, World Food Program (WFP) or NGOs where performing direct operations is not possible at present due to security reasons.

Another finding relates to the gradual significance that human security has acquired in Japan’s foreign aid policy since 1998, when the then Prime Minister (PM) Obuchi linked the concept to Japanese foreign policy and established a Trust Fund for Human Security in the UN in 1999. With regard to Africa, successive Japanese PMs, particularly Mori and Koizumi placed both human security at the core of Japan’s ODA reforms and Japan’s diplomacy and adopted it as a priority of the TICAD Process. In addition, MOFA also established another funding channel specifically to support human security projects – the Grant Aid for Grassroots Human Security Projects budgeting US$100 million in 2008. And JICA, in line with the ODA Charter and Mid-Term ODA Policy, changed its approach to development cooperation: It introduced a requirement for project officers to consider human security aspects at the design stage thus, reflecting its “new” seven guide principles to implement the human security concept in its entire dimension.

One last finding is that the Japanese government’s philosophical approach to human security contrasts with that of Canada, for example, which allows humanitarian intervention via the use of military power. This is a clear example of how two middle powers project the same concept of “human security” as an instrument of “soft-power” politics to capitalize capabilities and redefine their foreign policy in the 21st century.

The case study chapters (five and six) form part three of this study. The chapters, besides surveying the overall allocation of Japan’s ODA to Africa, examined the major quantitative and qualitative changes of Japanese ODA to Africa and established a comparison with major DAC donors. In addition, based on a country typology of economic development, the geographical distribution of Japan’s ODA to the overall recipients in sub-Saharan Africa before and after the Cold War was analyzed, paying special attention to four traditional recipients of Japanese ODA: Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia. The aim was to identify if there was a common pattern of Japanese ODA allocation to traditional recipient countries (also low-income countries) as compared to fragile states or conflict affected countries, particularly Angola and Mozambique, the pivotal cases studied in this research.

Chapter five found that from the 1960s to the late 1980s, the priority of Japanese aid was not to Africa but Asia. Therefore, Japanese aid relations with Asia affected the allocation of ODA to Africa. By the mid-1980s Japan was already a major aid power to Africa among DAC donors. However, though becoming the world’s top aid donor in 1989, Japan has continually failed the qualitative objectives delineated by DAC members in 1968, by the UNGA in 1970, and by Japan
itself in the Fourth Medium-Term target of ODA formulated in 1988. Thus, the ODA target of 0.7 percent is becoming more and more a “mirage” for most of the OECD donors including Japan that for decades has justified its failure to increase ODA volume in terms of financial restrictions. It is clear that fiscal restraints are but an excuse of the Japanese government for not increasing the volume of ODA, since aid here would not affect much in terms of balancing the budget.

With regard to the overall assessment of Japanese aid by type, sector, and regional distribution throughout the 1960-2008 period, there was a general improvement particularly after the 1990s. Here, the grant and technical cooperation portion of bilateral ODA shows an increase while loans have decreased. The overall sector distribution feature also shows an increase in the share of Japanese ODA allocation to social infrastructures and production sectors well above the DAC average, and ranking below only the United States. As for regional distribution, Japan like other donors has a regional perspective in its aid allocation. However, the gradual re-composition of geographical distribution by Japan from Asia to other regions increased after the mid-1970s particularly to Africa.

This chapter also analysed the evolution of Japan’s ODA to Africa from 1960 to 2008 based on Japan’s ODA medium-term targets (ended in 1997) and Mid-Term Policy on ODA of 1999 and 2005. Based on the interaction of international and domestic factors, it focused on quantitative and qualitative changes in the aid policy.

In the quantitative changes two remarks are worth pointing out. The first is Japan’s increase of aid from mid-1970s onward drew African criticisms in regard to its international commitments within the G7 group and its own political and commercial interests. Second, after the Cold War Japan’s expansion policy through ODA, which was established in 1977, came to an end. Japanese aid policy then took the initiative of preparing DAC’s New Development Strategy in 1996 featuring the concepts of self-help efforts (ownership) and partnership, which had already become part of the TICAD Process. Another finding is that for the first time in Japan’s ODA history and though in the ODA Charter Japan has traditionally prioritized Asia, doubling its ODA to Africa. As a result, Japan’s total bilateral ODA to Africa surpassed that to Asia in terms of volume in 2006, 2007, and 2008.

It was also found that in terms of multilateral aid to the African Development Bank (AfDB) and African Development Fund (AfDF), the volume of Japanese ODA from 1975 to 2008 increased dramatically. During the 1980s, Japan’s disbursements were mostly for support of the World Banks’ Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). However, after the 1990s and 2000s the MOF and MOFA shifted their approaches. Now there is less emphasis on macro policy and more emphasis on accountability. Also, in 1994 the MOF signed the first cooperation agreement with the World Bank and established the Japan Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRDG). It re-started yen-loan for the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and for the Joint Bank, the Japan Enhanced
Private Sector Assistance (EPSA) initiative, and also the JBIC Facility for African Investment within the TICAD framework in 2009.

With regard to qualitative trends there was an overall improvement of Japanese aid to Africa visible in the grant share particularly after the mid-1980s. In part, the OECD, the UNGA, and the DAC pressures for Japan improve the quality of its aid explain the “green revolution” of the Suzuki administration to extend grant aid for the production sectors, basic human needs, and structural adjustment measures. The fact is that the quality of Japan’s aid until the mid-1990s was more rhetorical than real as aid implementation was still focused on the “hardware” rather than on the “software” aspects of aid. With the reform of JICA after 2006 and creation of the new JICA in 2008, the quality rather than the quantity of aid became the major goal in the aid system. In addition, the implementation of aid supporting Africa was strengthened with the creation of country-based ODA Tasks Forces and Country Assistance Programs (CAPs) in order to set the priorities for all Japanese assistance there. In this case, changes in the quality of aid such as in a preference for human security grassroots projects, rather than a change in volume of aid, were more perceptible.

With regard to changes in aid policy, there was an important change in terms of establishing aid philosophy beyond the “request-basis” principle. This was achieved through the enactment of the ODA Charter in 1992, revised in 2003 that anchors both Japanese humanitarian interests and links them with the concept of human security for the protection of individuals at all stages from conflict to reconstruction and development. There were more quantitative changes rather than qualitative changes. Grant aid to politically unstable countries declined as Japanese ODA depended upon the recipient’s ownership and self-help efforts to abide the conditions stated in the ODA Charter. This choice gave political credibility to the ODA Charter, demonstrating that the benefits are much higher than the costs. The ODA Charter is complemented by Japan’s Medium Term Policy on ODA that highlights transnational threats to human security which if not properly envisaged can affect Japan’s security and prosperity. Third, there was also a profound change in Japanese aid diplomacy, namely the organization of the TICAD Process. Both the ODA Charter and the TICAD have been instrumental in influencing MOFA’s allocation of ODA to Africa in the sense that the traditional and selective way of distributing ODA to African countries deemed political or economically more important in the past has been reversing since. As a result, in the early years of Japanese aid to Africa, and until the 1980s and mid-1990s, 70 percent of Japanese total bilateral ODA was allocated to 12-13 countries out of a possible 40. In 2008 the same 70 percent share was allocated to 36 countries out of a possible 48 Japanese recipients.

MOFA’s geographical re-allocation of ODA is strongly related with Africa’s economic development and particularly conflict-affectedness. In this context, it was pointed that the geographical distribution of Japanese ODA to Africa was based on a four-category country typology of economic development, which
characterizes Japanese ODA recipients, and then divided within three groups according with the volume of Japanese aid from 1969 to 2008. The common points between the recipients independently of the category group is that they all have development needs and were allocated with Japanese ODA. However, in the typology there are two categories that stand out. The fragile states category is comprised of 16 countries receiving Japanese aid, and non-fragile low-income countries include 16 countries as well. The middle-income countries and resource-rich countries category have 7 and 8 countries, respectively. In addition, of the four traditional recipients chosen as references for understanding the case studies of Japan’s aid to Angola and Mozambique, three (Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania) are categorized as non-fragile low-income countries and one (Zambia) fits into the category of resource-rich country.

Two observations are pointed out. First, the traditional recipients no longer monopolize Japan’s ODA. Second, Japan’s assistance to Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia is not aimed at rebuilding those countries because they are neither fragile states nor conflict-affected countries. At most, Japan’s assistance to consolidation of peace in these countries aims to enhance their democratic and good governance capabilities to support Japan’s peacebuilding activities in each region and Africa. Therefore, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia are useful as a baseline study of Japanese aid from the perspective of further realizing the third pillar achieved by TICAD III. Another finding in regard to these countries is that between them the Japanese aims at social and economic development focused on agriculture, infrastructure development (transport, energy, water supply, health facilities and medical services) private sector development (revitalizing small and medium-sized enterprises) and human resources development (technical and vocational education, etc.,) and not consolidation of peace. In sum, Japanese promotion of consolidation of peace seems to have opened a virtuous cycle in Japanese ODA raising awareness of the benefits of this new field in ODA assistance as a way to improve effectiveness and achieve medium-long term results in the country or countries where development moves from war to peace.

Finally, the importance of ODA in the TICAD in the post-Cold War international system meant that Japan no longer needed to support anti-Communist and White regimes. This international systemic change had a deep impact on Japan’s aid diplomacy, giving Tokyo space to launch its own diplomatic initiate: the TICAD Process. The importance of ODA in the TICAD is that it links the three pillars of TICAD, i.e. poverty-reduction through economic growth, human-centered development, and consolidation of peace. The prevalence of the third pillar over the first two is justified for three reasons. First, it put an end to Japan’s past form of providing economic assistance. Second, the effect of having the 3rd pillar is that it institutionalizes a peacebuilding role for Japanese ODA, which did not exist during the Cold War, at least formally. Third, Japan’s assistance to fragile states that in Africa, which are numerous, shows consistency both in domestic policies and TICAD in terms that peace and stability is both a priority and a key
feature of Japanese assistance to Africa, and that international norms reflected in
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 in October 2000 urged
member states to ensure mechanisms for the prevention, management, and reso-
lution of conflicts.

Chapter six extended the authors’ argument to analyze Japan’s foreign aid
policy and the allocation of ODA to Angola and Mozambique with and without
the TICAD Process. The importance of a comparative approach to understanding
Angola and Mozambique results from the fact that these two recipients provide
a model—a case of success in Mozambique, and failure in Angola. This was es-
specially evident in the Mozambican successful transition from war to peace and
reform ownership in terms of the role of donors in the process of reforms (democ-
racy and market economy), and the institutional capacity of recipient govern-
ments in bringing about those reforms despite a similar pattern of decolonization
and democratization. In addition, they were not major recipients of Japanese aid
during the Cold War but now are. Finally there is a gap in the interplay of inter-
national factors and Japan’s domestic interests during and after the Cold War,
which required further research. As a result, several findings are noteworthy.

First is the finding that over time international pressures with multilater-
al and bilateral sources have shaped Japan’s foreign aid policy toward Angola
and Mozambique. During the 1950s and 1960s international pressures were not
enough to overcome Japan’s commercial and resource interests to Angola and
Mozambique. With regard to aid Japan lacked a clear aid policy concerning the
use of ODA for economic development, as aid was tied to export promotion.

In early 1970s Japan’s perception of the political changes in sub-Saharan
Africa was ahead of the Western powers. It recognized the independence of the
People’s Republic of Angola in 1976 and established diplomatic relations with
Mozambique in 1977. However, with Angola and Mozambique turning into the
Soviet field, reactive changes took precedence over Japanese economic interests.
In addition, the oil crisis deeply affected Japan’s own interests, now defined in
the context of the US-Japan alliance. This hindered the allocation of ODA.

In the early 1980s, international pressures became difficult to sustain and
once again reactive changes occurred in Japan’s aid policy. In 1985 and 1986, be-
sides the humanitarian, emergency relief to Mozambique, at the request of the
United States Japan granted aid more aid to Mozambique since Maputo agreed
to join the Bretton-Woods institutions thereby increasing a market orientation.
Angola reluctantly continued its socialist path and only aid relief was provided.

In the 1990s, the international system itself, especially the end of the bipolar
system and of geostrategic interests in Africa, provided Japan an opportunity to
promote its own national interests. Therefore, the dispatch of election monitors to
Angola and peacekeepers to Mozambique must be understood as an opportunity
to Japan detach itself from the United States and decide its own African diplo-
macy. Japan’s participation involved a political and military range never seen
before in Japan’s foreign policy toward Africa, breaking with its pacifist attitude
towards conflict prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa.

Japan’s security and development approach through peacekeeping and the TICAD illustrate its new foreign policy toward Africa. Although international pressure was a necessary condition for these policy shifts, it was insufficient to dominate decision-making procedures concerning the dispatch of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to Mozambique and election monitors to Angola. It was found that MOFA used international requests and domestic pressure as leverage to negotiate with domestic opposition and the participation in the PKO from September 1992 to October 1992 in Angola and from May 1993 to January 1995 in Mozambique. Thus, Angola and Mozambique’s conflict-affectedness have become Japan’s testing ground to merge peacebuilding with development within the TICAD framework. Japan’s foreign policy shift was also facilitated by the changes in the international system itself. The end of the bipolar order concluded Angola and Mozambique’s proxy Cold War dispute between the URSS and the USA. This systemic change provided Japan with an opportunity for a proactive diplomacy in African political and security affairs, which traditionally had been always avoided.

Another finding is that Japanese ODA sectoral distribution reveals the same pattern of assistance to both countries’ aid programs with a mix of “software” aid (social development and social infrastructure) with “hardware” (economic infrastructure) related to post-war reconstruction needs. Another common trend is in the wide geographical distribution of grassroots human security projects (like the cases of the previous chapter) financed with Japanese ODA. The data confirms the paradigm shift of Japanese ODA towards a new trend in development cooperation emphasizing consolidation of peace and human security rather different from the traditional concept of development assistance.

Two significant differences between Japanese ODA both in volume and bilateral programs were found. First while Japanese cumulative total bilateral ODA to Mozambique from 1975 up to 2009 amounted to US$841 million implemented in 162 projects, the figure for Angola in the same period amounted to US$279 million implemented in 75 projects. The reasons that explain this difference follow. First, the gradual reform ownership initiated in early 1980s from a socialist economy to a market economy led to acceptance of structural adjustment measures from the World Bank and the IMF. Second, Mozambican peaceful transition from war to peace culminated with multiparty elections in 1994. In contrast, Angola refused to reform during the 1980s and afterwards, and even though the contesting parties (MPLA and UNITA) have signed a peace accord in 1991 and held UN-monitored multiparty elections in 1992, UNITA (the opposing party to the government) did not accept the results. It restarted a war that only ended in 2002. The second is that over the long run, Angola’s bilateral program was mainly composed of grants and technical assistance. For Mozambique, besides grant aid and technical assistance one yen-loan has been granted. With regard to Japanese aid policy for Africa, as indicated at the last four TICAD it was found that the
development needs of Angola and Mozambique match the TICAD framework, or three pillars: human centered development, poverty reduction through economic growth, and consolidation of peace. Though is difficult to demonstrate a quantitative causal relationship between development achievement and Japanese assistance, the impact of the aid was assessed in qualitative terms. It was found that the priority areas agreed upon in the policy dialogues between Japan and Mozambique and Japan and Angola are consistent with those of the TICAD Process. Therefore, Japan ODA was found to be effective towards the respective development goals of both recipients’ priority sectors, including demining, DDR, agriculture, education, health, water and sanitation, and roads, bridges, and linkage with economic corridors.

In summary, Japanese aid, although maintaining the political, strategic and resource interests of the past, has demonstrated qualitative strengths in peacebuilding, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. This is true particularly in the field of basic human needs, human security and social infrastructure development. It also provides evidence of Japan’s development agenda set forth at the last four TICAD as going beyond the solely commercial purposes by incorporating a regional cooperation approach that had not been demonstrated prior to the TICAD Process.

Chapter seven is the last or fourth part of this study. Overall, it found that the study has a variety of causal determinants of Japan’s aid policy to Angola, Mozambique, and sub-Saharan Africa and shows a complex interplay of multiple approaches and theoretical perspectives. This is a strong argument for eclecticism in terms of mixing different approaches and international relations schools of thought.

Methodologically, the chapter emphasized the qualitative rather than the quantitative effects of Japanese ODA. In this context, it provided the results for Angola and Mozambique here categorized as fragile states. Empirical findings were based on aid as a percentage of gross national income, aid as a percentage or international trade, and aid as a percentage of foreign direct investment (FDI). The determinants of ODA in both countries were assessed over a time span of twenty-six years i.e. from 1982 to 2008. They were examined via four hypotheses, which investigated the effects of peacekeeping/peacebuilding, good governance, ODA, trade and FDI.

3. Main Results

The results were analysed within the perspective of Japan’s national interests, human security policy, and the framework of the TICAD Process. The results of the four hypotheses advanced were confirmed with the main findings as follows.

Hypothesis one related the liberalist perspective and peacebuilding interests
through Japan’s contribution to strengthening the consolidation of peace in Angola and Mozambique hence, enhancing their peace, security, and development.

It found that Japanese aid in the 1990s emphasized an area of area of liberalism that as a general theoretical perspective has achieved new credibility within the democratic-peace area motivated by liberal concerns within the concept of human security. The liberalist perspective also helped us to understand the contests and cooperation between domestic actors involved in the making of foreign policy as emphasized in the bureaucratic approach. The linkage of the hypothesis to domestic and international norms is evident in the ODA Charter, Japan’s Medium-Term Policy on ODA (2005), and the DAC Guidelines for Helping Preventing Conflict (2001). It is also within Japan’s international commitments achieved at the G8 Summit Gleneagles in 2005.

It was also found that Japan’s commitment at TICAD II to provide assistance in the demining of Angola and Mozambique was been crucial for these two countries carry on their development. This results from the evidence that magnitude of landmine contamination in Angola and Mozambique is such that without demining it is impossible to advance practice of agriculture, social, and economic reconstruction. The millions of landmines spread over the entire provinces have negative social impact and the people who live in the region.

*Hypothesis two* relates the pluralist perspective and Japanese good governance interests through positive and democratic changes in Angola and Mozambique. As a result of those changes, MOFA began supporting good governance in terms of participation of civil society in the reconstruction and development with more ODA to support local and international NGOs grassroots human security projects.

This perspective was also useful to show MOFA’s shift from a Cold War foreign policy based on economic and political interests to one policy based on the four principles of the ODA Charter as important aspects of “good governance.” It also found that MOFA’s aid policy is consistent both with TICAD and JICA’s involvement in fragile states within the human security perspective. The data revealed that Japan’s pluralist interests are being strongly applied in Angola and Mozambique with direct support to local and international NGOs. The NGOs activities, such as in health, education, productive activities, and peacebuilding related areas (demining, DDR, IDPs, refugees) have clearly shown that the projects match the human security concept as drawn both in the ODA Charter, the Medium-Term Policy on ODA, and the TICAD Process. From 1999 to 2009, Japan’s ODA to NGO Grant Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGHSP) in Angola amounted to US$4.5 million and supported 25 GGHSP. With regard to Mozambique, on a scale similar to that of Angola the NGOs supported by Japanese ODA amounted to US$6.1 million used to implement 57 projects from 2001 to 2008.

Another important finding about Japanese ODA to NGO and INGOs in Angola and Mozambique helped to understand the pluralist perspective as Japa-
nese ODA to various activities relating to human security were supported. These include programs targeting education, gender issues, reintegration of former soldiers, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees by engaging non-state actors in support of civil society and shifting the implementation of ODA from a state-to-state approach to a state-local approach. Finally, and in line with the author’s framework (see Figure 2.1) the hypothesis also answered the query in regard to Mozambique’s allocation of more ODA to NGOs than Angola’s, thus moving it to the next stage of development faster than Angola. As already explained, Mozambique’s successful transition from war to peace and also Maputo’s higher efforts in reform ownership as compared to Luanda, and in tandem with the ODA Charter, were duly rewarded by Japan with ODA; this explains the faster transition of stage according to the author’s framework.

Hypothesis three related the idealist perspective of Japan’s increasing level of aid for Angola and Mozambique’s basic human needs to start reconstruction thus, reducing poverty. The hypothesis confirmed that Japan’s ODA reflects the idealist perspective in terms of recognition of human solidarity and moral responsibilities with all nations, especially with the poorest ones or alternatively those more in need.

This hypothesis however, does not disregard the fact that humanitarian interests for Japan or any other donor are important to justify its public opinion that aid is being altruistically spent. In this context, it was found that Japan, like any major aid power, is highly pragmatic when it comes to providing economic assistance. However, it should be recalled that even after the enactment of the ODA Charter Japan has not stopped providing emergency relief and food aid to certain recipients that had broke the spirit of the ODA Charter. This is evidence that independently of the recipient legitimacy to rule or not, Japan, though suspending grant aid, does not stop providing humanitarian assistance. This is regardless race, religion, or political affiliation.

In the cases of Angola and Mozambique, Japan’s major challenge was to link humanitarian assistance and development assistance in order to integrate short term-relief and rehabilitation into the context of longer-term approaches aimed at fostering self-reliance. In this context, the TICAD Process was the best framework because the TICAD three pillars adapted perfectly to Angola and Mozambique state fragility and post-conflict affectedness as explained in Chapter five, and in the author’s framework in Chapter two (see Figure 2.1). The findings have shown that Japanese aid as a percentage of Angola’s GNI was not high. However, it should be noted that Angola is a resource rich country with a per capita gross national income (GNI) much higher than that of Mozambique and even higher than the Africa average: This explains the lower inflows of aid. In addition, the final cease-fire in Angola was only attained in 2002, in contrast to Mozambique, which achieved that in 1994. All these factors explain the higher volume of Japanese ODA to Mozambique and the higher statistic of Japanese ODA as a percentage of Mozambique’s GNI.
The hypothesis also found that trade was not significant in Japanese aid decision. This indicates the importance of humanitarian interests along the idealist perspective. However, it became clear that Japan’s humanitarian and development assistance is not proportional to the welfare and peacebuilding needs of Angola and Mozambique. This was particularly evident in the case of Angola, thus showing that other interests such as political and economic ones are clearly important as shown in Chapter six. Therefore, it is clear that Japan should provide more aid to development. However, at Angola’s stage of post-conflict affectedness it was also found evidence that until the country is mine free it is not possible to increase development assistance because Angola’s first priority is demining. Moreover, Angola and Mozambican peacebuilding needs are so great that Japan alone cannot solve them. Nevertheless, Japanese assistance as shown in Chapter six is being consistent with Angola’s and Mozambican immediate needs with and without the TICAD Process.

Hypothesis four related the heterodox neoliberalist perspective with Japanese aid allocation to trade-related infrastructures in Angola and Mozambique in order to increase the recipients trade capacity with Japan thus, helping them reducing poverty. And, in line with the TICAD Process, if these recipients trade between each other or with Japan on a partnership basis, it means that Japan is contributing to their economic growth.

This theoretical perspective reflects the shift of Japan’s development strategy in Africa that until late 1980s followed the World Bank’s view based on orthodox neoliberalism. This view emphasized the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), macroeconomic stability, free financial markets, and free trade policies. However, after the 1990s, Japanese divergences mounted against the hegemonic American and British model of development. The TICAD Process helped Japan to sustain its own views of development as African leaders became receptive to the Asian experience and to a higher and positive intervention of the state to moderate the past orthodox policies of the IMF and the World Bank. As a result, the TICAD Process and its emphasis on human security found a compromise between the heterodox and the orthodox views of development. This is expressed, for example, in Japan’s higher emphasis on economic infrastructures without disregard for Japan’s new development approach, which, adopted by the OECD in 1996, combines ODA, trade, and FDI on a country-to-country based on specific needs.

This hypothesis found that a considerable weight of aid particularly in Angola in the economy is stark in relation to external trade. As a result, the trade volume between Japan and Angola and between Japan and Mozambique is not high enough to link Japanese aid to formal tying or to a continuous aid-induced trade dependency. If this were the case, Japan would be granting Angola and Mozambique large amounts of aid, which is not the case. In addition, the results also substantiate the argument that Japan’s aid/trade relationship with Angola and Mozambique is not a causal relationship of either trade dependency (recipi-
ent imports from donor). Nor is it trade creating (economic growth in the recipient generates donor exports). Instead, the findings point to the influence of the heterodox neo-liberal paradigm as indicated in the case of Angola through Japanese ODA for the rehabilitation of the major ports in Angola. This is also the case of Mozambique with development projects such as Mozal (Mozambique Aluminum Smelter), the spatial development initiative (SDI) of New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) inspired in the Maputo Development Corridor (Mozambique), in the Zambia-Malawi-Mozambique growth triangle, in the repair of the Nampula-Cuamba road part of the Nacala corridor project. It is included in the Protocol for Transport, Communications, and Meteorology of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) within a regional framework, and also relevant to funding from the African Development Bank (AfDB), South Korea, and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) as well. All of these examples of Japanese ODA to Mozambique and Angola within the TICAD Process provide evidence of the linkage between the heterodox neoliberalist perspective that include development of socio economic infrastructures, such as the "michinoeki" concept along the Nacala corridor in Mozambique that impacts the local communities' economic and social development.

Another finding is that over time the lack of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Angola and in Mozambique confirms Ampiah's stance with regard to Nigeria, namely that ODA to Angola and Mozambique is not resource-oriented. Therefore, Japanese aid policy to the above recipients cannot be explained either by the neo-classical international trade-theory of differences in factor endowments or the neo-realist theory that notes that states like Japan regard foreign aid as an instrument to strengthen its economy and protect its national interests.

4. Conclusion

As Katzentstein and Okawara note, strict formulations of theoretical perspectives sacrifice explanatory power in the interest of analytic purity. However, the results of this study show several "competing explanations of Japanese ODA policy to Angola and Mozambique" (see Figure 2.2). Accordingly, the TICAD Process demonstrates that the philosophical assumption of TICAD goes beyond the classical neoliberalist orthodox free market approach, the idealistic humanitarian provision of aid relief, and the pluralist perspective that includes and combines multiple issues such as governance, human rights. NGOs that are an active

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component of the civil society in Angola and Mozambique which also fall within the broader paradigm of human security and the liberalist paradigm that regards security in its various dimensions, and introduces cooperation, democracy, peacbuilding, trade, and foreign direct investment (FDI), regional integration, alongside state interests are also demonstrated by TICAD Process results.

As a result, eclectic theorizing helped us understanding the complex social, political, and economic processes both of Japan’s foreign aid policy and also of the TICAD Process. In this context, our findings demonstrate considerable differences within the above theories of international relations, and even implicit realist goals in terms of “soft-power” politics in the Japanese state political agenda to be attained through the TICAD. This supports the claim that TICAD is clearly a comprehensive method through which Japan materializes its national interests.

In addition, from a comparative perspective, while the examination of Japan’s aid policy to Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, and Tanzania found no significant differences in the ODA allocation pattern, it did find differences between them when compared to Angola and Mozambique. This is highly relevant to the study in terms of showing that after the Cold War era there is a different and significant new pattern in Japan’s aid approach to Africa. Further, the authors’ framework compiled specifically for this study (see Figure 2.1) allowed the reader to lay out the several overlapping stages of Japan’s aid to Angola and Mozambique within the TICAD Process, showing that Japanese ODA is clearly linked with the TICAD Process. The study has also shown that Japan has interests beyond humanitarian concerns such as security, political, and economic interests.

Broadly speaking, Japan’s aid relationship with Angola and Mozambique has been stimulated both by diplomatic and political interests on the one hand and by the countries’ actual humanitarian and peacbuilding needs on the other. This correspondence with actual development needs brings into perspective the new paradigm of aid assistance where peacbuilding assistance can no longer be considered an issue apart from development assistance, as the two operations must interact together. Nevertheless, over time the political ties, which were stimulated by Japan’s participation in the peacekeeping operations, have translated into stronger economic ties between Japan and these two recipients.

The study has clearly shown that after the mid-1990s Japanese African diplomacy became a more serious issue not only inside of MOFA, clearly the Ministry with most decision-aid power concerning Africa, but in other ministries as well that have become engaged in African diplomacy through the TICAD Process.

Finally, the significance of this study is that it greatly advanced the analysis of Japan’s foreign aid policy to Angola and Mozambique, which so far has not been made in this dimension. Additionally, the data compiled for this study serves as invaluable contribution for further research. Therefore, this study has provided an important contribution to an understanding of the interaction between international and domestic factors and the extent to which of each of those
factors have affected Japan’s aid policy to Angola and Mozambique and sub-Saharan African as well, during and after the Cold War and both inside and outside of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD).

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